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Abstract
We develop a growth model with unemployment due to imperfections in the
labor market. In this model, wage inertia and balanced budget rules cause a com-
plementarity between capital and employment capable of explaining the existence
of multiple equilibrium paths. Hysteresis is viewed as the result of a selection be-
tween these diﬀerent paths. We use this model to argue that, in contrast to the
US, those ﬁscal policies followed by most of the European countries after the
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This paper takes a new look at the hysteresis hypotheses and provides new insights to
evaluate the European unemployment problem. More precisely, the aim of this paper
is to provide an explanation of the following two empirical regularities that existing
literature has shown1: i) the close relation between the unemployment rate trajectory
and the growth rate of capital stock; and ii) the existence of two regimes (this being
the central feature of the hysteresis hypotheses) in the unemployment rate. In contrast
with most of the existing literature, we explain these empirical regularities as the result
of equilibria selection in an endogenous growth model with wage inertia, where direct
taxes are set by the government to balance its budget constraint.
The fact that European labor markets have never recovered the full employment
levels which characterized the 1960s and ﬁrst 1970s remains as one of the main puz-
zles in economics. The Structuralist approach (see Phelps (1994)) explains this puzzle
arguing that the persistent increase in unemployment is the result of a combination of
persistent shocks that raised the Natural Rate of Unemployment (NRU).2 In contrast,
the hysteresis hypothesis tackles this puzzle outlining the role played by the extremely
persistent eﬀects of the temporary shocks occurred in the 1970s. Within the studies
explaining unemployment hysteresis, we should diﬀerentiate between those arguing that
temporary shocks have persistent eﬀects on unemployment because the speed of conver-
gence is extremely low, and those arguing that temporary shocks have persistent eﬀects
because they make agents coordinate into another equilibrium path, where the economy
remains when the shock is over. Our paper belongs to the latter line of research, and
explains the patterns of unemployment as a result of equilibrium selection.
Blanchard and Summers (1988) argued that it was necessary to go beyond the nat-
ural rate hypothesis and concluded that “theories of fragile equilibria [a concept to
highlight the sensitive dependence of unemployment on current and past events] are
necessary to come to grip with events in Europe”. Despite this claim, the work on mul-
tiple equilibria has not played a major role in the literature. Two main contributions in
this area are Diamond (1982) and Mortensen (1989), but in the context of search and
matching models, which fall well apart from the dynamic general equilibrium approach
we propose in this paper. From the more traditional perspective of the demand-supply
side analysis, Manning (1990 and 1992) argued in favor of models with multiple equi-
libria to explain the postwar behavior of unemployment. Nonetheless, the mainstream
literature on unemployment in the 1990s has kept apart from the multiple equilibria
perspective and, following the work by Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), has focused
mainly on the NRU/NAIRU (i.e., a unique unemployment equilibrium rate), leaving
also the hysteresis hypothesis a secondary role. Some work is, of course, being done on
the hysteresis hypotheses, but mainly with an empirical concern.3 Part of this literature
1Bianchi and Zoega (1998) show the existence of two regimes in the unemployment rate. Henry,
Karanassou and Snower (2000) and Karanassou, Sala and Snower (2003) provide evidence on the
relation between unemployment and capital accumulation.
2See, for example, Hoon and Phelps (1992) and Phelps and Zoega (1998) for an analysis of the
shocks explaining the rise in the NRU.
3Some examples are Cross (1988 and 1995), and some papers therein that relate the hysteresis
hypothesis with the NRU; Jaeger and Parkinson (1994) and, recently, Piscitelli, Cross, Grinfeld and
Lamba (2000), Hughes Hallet and Piscitelli (2002) and León-Ledesma-McAdam (2003), on the empir-
ical testing of the hysteresis hypotheses.
2is related with the ﬁnding of multiple equilibria in unemployment rates, generally by
the use of Markov regime switching models. For example, in León-Ledesma-McAdam
(2003) the presence of a high and low equilibria in most of the Central and Eastern
European countries is observed; Akram (1998 and 1999) applies this analysis to Nor-
way and, ﬁnally, Bianchi and Zoega (1998) ﬁnd that the observed persistence in the
unemployment rate of 15 OECD countries is consistent with multiple equilibria models.4
Given the empirical bias of this work, the main sets of candidates for explaining
hysteresis are still the ones initially proposed in Blanchard and Summers (1986a and
1986b), a ﬁrst one pointing to insider-outsider arguments, a second one to capital accu-
mulation (either in the form of physical or human capital) and a third one to ﬁscal policy.
In contrast with the extensive literature on the insider-outsider argument (see among
many others Lindbeck and Snower (2001)), the other two explanations have received
little relative attention in the theoretical literature. On the one hand, Coimbra, Lloyd-
Braga and Modesto (2000) and Ortigueira (2003) are among the few exceptions arguing
that a low accumulation of capital may explain persistent high unemployment rates.5
On the other hand, Den Haan (2003) and Rocheteau (1999) show, in the framework of
a matching model without capital accumulation, that balanced budget rules may yield
multiple steady states. Actually, these authors develop the original argument by Blan-
chard and Summers (1986b) and show that balanced budget rules may turn persistent,
and eventually, permanent, the eﬀects of a temporary shock on unemployment.
In contrast to the mainstream theoretical literature, generally overlooking the close
relation displayed by the data between capital accumulation and unemployment,6 we
outline the central role of ﬁscal policies in the framework of an endogenous growth model
where, because of wage inertia, capital stock growth is found to have permanent eﬀects
on employment: labor demand is continuously shifted up by capital accumulation,
thereby causing a permanent eﬀect on employment because the wage, due to its inertia,
does not fully adjust to labor demand shifts. In this framework, we show that balanced
budget rules may provide an explanation of the hysteresis hypothesis in the patterns of
employment and economic growth.
We show that ﬁscal policy explains hysteresis in a simple endogenous growth model
with a linear aggregate production function, where the consumption-savings decision
4The analysis of Bianchi and Zoega (1998) shows the existence of two regimes in the unemployment
rate. This ﬁnding can be explained as the result of either an endogenous NRU or hysteresis. Moreover,
the analysis of Phelps and Zoega (1998) rejects the possibility of extremely low speeds of convergence
and, thus, does not support this explanation of hysteresis. This analysis, though, does not reject an
explanation based on multiple equilibria, which is able to explain the persistence of temporary shocks
even with high speeds of convergence. It follows that both, the multiple equilibria and the endogenous
NRU approaches are plausible candidates to explain Bianchi and Zoega’s (1998) ﬁndings.
5Like us, Coimbra, et. al. (2000) argue in favor of multiple steady states, but with an Overlapping
Generations Model with strong increasing returns to scale, which are at odds with the empirical
evidence (see Basu and Fernald (1997)). In turn, our approach also diﬀers from Ortigueira (2003),
whose analysis is based on a model of labor search with frictional unemployment and human capital
accumulation.
6Some empirical literature shows that there is a close relationship between these two variables. This
is outlined by Rowthorn (1999) who suggests “that a major factor behind persistent unemployment
may also be inadequate growth in capital stock”. Henry, Karanassou and Snower (2000) point to the
importance of the role of capital stock in inﬂuencing the UK unemployment trajectory, but it is in
Karanassou, Sala and Snower (2003) where a reappraisal of the causes of european unemployment is
provided, and capital stock is shown to be an important determinant (if not the leading one) of the
movements in the European unemployment rate.
3is taken by a representative inﬁnitely lived dynasty. Unemployment arises from labor
market imperfections introduced by assuming that unions set the wage to maximize an
objective function depending on labor and the level of wages net of taxes relative to a
reference wage level. Following de la Croix and Collard (2000), and subsequent work,
the latter is identiﬁed as a stock of habits. The assumption on the unions’ behavior
implies that the solution to the maximization problem is a wage equation that sets
the wage net of taxes as a constant mark-up over the reference wage. This introduces
wage inertia because the reference wage is constructed as a weighted average of past
labor income. To close the model, we assume that total government disbursements (i.e.,
government spending and unemployment beneﬁts) are ﬁnanced by means of both direct
taxes and non-distortionary taxes, aiming to maintain a balanced budget rule. To this
end, we assume that either government spending or direct taxes are endogenous and
adjust to keep the budget constraint balanced. When government spending is treated
as endogenous, direct tax rates are constant and, hence, exhibit an acyclical behavior.
In contrast, when direct tax rates are considered endogenous, we expect them to be
countercyclical; i.e., to be high in bad times and low in good times. This is simply a
result from the fact that public disbursements, such as unemployment beneﬁts, rise in
bad times and shrink in good times.7
When direct tax rates are assumed to be exogenous and constant, the higher is
economic growth the higher capital accumulation and the more the labor demand shifts
up. Thus, employment is enhanced, provided the rise in labor demand does not fully
translate into wage increases, which happens when wage inertia is suﬃciently strong.
In Section 4 we show that the equilibrium path with exogenous taxes is unique and
conclude that fails to explain hysteresis.
When direct tax rates are assumed to be endogenous, they generate a complemen-
tarity between capital accumulation and employment that makes agents’ expectations
self-fulﬁlling and, hence, generate multiple equilibrium paths. To see it, assume that
agents coordinate into an expectations of high net interest rate. If agents are willing
to substitute consumption intertemporally, the savings rate will be large and so will be
the growth rates of capital stock and labor demand. When there is wage inertia, the
latter implies high values of the employment rate and, thus, strong economic activity,
implying large government revenues and low government expenditures. Obviously, the
endogenous direct tax rate will be low in equilibrium and hence the equilibrium interest
rate net of taxes will be large, which ensures that agents’ expectations hold in equilib-
rium. This explains the existence of an equilibrium path corresponding to an economic
regime of high economic activity and, analogously, the existence of another equilibrium
path corresponding to a low regime. In Section 5, we show that the assumption of
endogenous taxes may cause the existence of two diﬀerent equilibrium paths converging
to diﬀerent steady states. One of them corresponds to a high regime characterized by
high employment, savings and growth rates, and low direct tax rates; whereas the other
one is a regime characterized by low employment, growth and savings rates, and high
tax rates. Along these two equilibrium paths, government spending as a fraction of
income is constant and, thus, both paths converge to diﬀerent steady states that belong
7Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) denote by endogenous taxes those taxes that adjust in order
to balance the government budget constraint. They show that endogenous taxes cause the local
indeterminacy of the equilibrium path in a neoclassical growth model with a perfectly competitive
labor market.
4to diﬀerent sides of the same Laﬀer curve. In this context, we interpret hysteresis as
the result of equilibrium selection between these two paths.
The assumptions on the ﬁscal policy drive the transition. When tax rates are exoge-
nous, employment and the savings rate are negatively related, as a larger employment
rate causes a positive wealth eﬀect that reduces the savings rate. In contrast, when tax
rates are endogenous, employment and the savings rate display, along the two equilib-
rium paths, a positive correlation due to a substitution eﬀect. In that case, a larger
employment rate implies a lower direct tax rate and, hence, larger net interest and
savings rates.
The model allows us to derive a number of necessary conditions to generate hys-
teresis. These are: i) Strong wage rigidities; ii) Endogenous tax rates; and iii) Large
willingness to substitute consumption intertemporally. These conditions point to the
relevance of the link between labor market institutions, ﬁscal policy and agents decisions
on savings.
Our model matches remarkably well some observed regularities explained in Section
2. In particular, using Kernel density functions, we show that most of the European
economies display high and low regimes in unemployment and the growth rate of capital
stock, whereas the US economy displays a unique regime in unemployment. Interest-
ingly, direct taxes seem to have been acyclical in the US economy, in contrast with
most of the European ones, where they have tended to be countercyclical. This sug-
gests that the experience of the US corresponds to our scenario of exogenous taxes
and a unique equilibrium path, whereas the European experience seems to ﬁtw i t ht h e
case where direct tax rates are used to balance the government budget constraint and
diﬀerent equilibria exist. Thus, we are able to reinterpret the diﬀerent consequences
of the shocks suﬀered by these two areas in the 1970s, whose main expression was a
temporal downturn in total factor productivity (TFP). In the US, direct tax rates were
kept constant and the TFP downturn produced a temporary fall in savings, economic
growth and employment, which progressively recovered to reach the original equilib-
rium. There were no permanent consequences, as the model explains when tax rates
are exogenous. In contrast, the European experience seems to correspond to a case
where direct tax rates are endogenous and two equilibrium paths exist. In that case,
the shocks of the 1970’s and the resulting temporal TFP downturn may have caused
agents to coordinate into a low regime equilibrium, hence keeping permanent the eﬀects
of these temporary shocks.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 provides an evaluation of the
regime changes in unemployment, which we ﬁnd closely related with the trajectory of
the capital stock growth rate. The behavior of the direct tax rate is also examined.
Section 3 describes a simple growth model. The equilibrium is characterized in the two
subsequent sections, but in two diﬀerent cases: when direct tax rates are exogenous
(Section 4) and when they are endogenous (Section 5). Section 6 summarizes our
ﬁndings and concludes.
2. Empirical evidence underlying our theoretical modelling
In this section we provide evidence on the diﬀerences between the European economies
and the US in the path of unemployment and the capital stock growth rates. As
the model highlights the role of ﬁscal policies to explain hysteresis, we also study the
5behavior of the direct tax rates.
The analysis we undertake next is inspired in Bianchi and Zoega (1998) and relies
on the estimation of Kernel density functions to identify regime changes in the time
series of unemployment and capital stock growth. When a time series displays diﬀerent
regimes, the density of the frequency distribution of that series will be multimodal,
with the number of modes corresponding to the number of regimes. Our identiﬁcation
criteria is the following. We will consider that a regime exists when the ﬁrst derivative
of the Kernel density function is zero and the second derivative is negative. This point
indicates the regime mean value, which can be seen as a local maximum (i.e., a point
with the highest density). When two or more regimes exist, a ‘valley point’ (the ﬁrst
derivative is zero and the second one is positive) divides the data points in the sample.
Those observations with values above the ‘valley point’ will belong to the upper regime,
whereas those with values below will belong to the lower regime. The model in Section
3 explains these kind of regime shifts as changes between steady states.
Our database is the same used in Karanassou, Sala and Snower (2003), containing
OECD annual data starting in the 1960s for the US and 11 European countries (Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom).8 Figure 1 pictures the sharp contrast between the unemployment
rate trajectory in Europe and the US.
[Insert Figure 1]
In Europe there is a neat regime shift, placed in 1980 by our Kernel density analysis,
which shifts the regime mean upwards from 2.5% to 9.7%. In contrast, the US analysis
reveals a unique regime, only altered at the beginning of the 1980s by what seems to
have been a one-oﬀ shock.9 It seems clear, thus, that the European has experienced a
permanent change, whereas the US series is characterized by a stationary pattern.
With respect to the aggregate capital stock series for Europe, there is no long time-
series directly provided by the OECD. Thus, we need to aggregate the series corre-
sponding to the pool of countries under consideration, which involves two important
requirements: ﬁrst, to establish an accurate criterion to assign country weights; second,
to avoid any noise derived from exchange rate ﬂuctuations, given that the capital stock
series are expressed in national currencies. The connection between capital stock and
o u t p u tp o i n ta tG D Pa st h er e l e v a n tm e a s u r et ow e i g h tt h ei n d i v i d u a lc a p i t a ls t o c k
series. Moreover, GDP series are generally available since the 1960s thus allowing the
computation of a yearly weight. To reach the second criterion, we use a series of real
GDP in Purchasing Power Parities. Since we are not interested in the European levels
of the capital stock, but on its growth rate, what we ﬁnally construct is an aggregate
series of the growth rate.10
8Due to the lack of data on capital stock, other countries are excluded from the analysis. Never-
theless, we refer to ‘Europe’ when taking the aggregate series from these 11 countries.
9The country-speciﬁc analysis is presented in Raurich, Sala and Sorolla (2004), where the Kernel
density analysis displayed in Figure 3 underlies the permanent regime changes plotted in Figure 2.
The main conclusion is that all countries experienced regime shifts in their unemployment series.
10For Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany and Italy we have data on capital stock since 1960 (on
the growth rate since 1961). Nevertheless, the growth rate of the aggregate capital stock series starts in
1963 because since 1962 we also have data for France and the UK, and since 1963 for Spain, all countries
with substantial weight in the EU. The rest of the countries are progressively taken into account, the
6[Insert Figure 2]
With the aggregate European and US series we conduct a Kernel density analysis
and obtain the results displayed in Figure 2. In Figure 2c a ﬁr s tr e g i m ei si d e n t i ﬁed for
Europe, lasting from 1963 to 1974, and having a mean capital stock growth rate of 4.9%.
The second one starts in 1975 and lasts up to 1999, with a regime mean of 2.7%.11 The
only exceptional data point in this regime occurs in 1991, when the series comes across
the German uniﬁcation consequences, in the form of a sudden rise in the growth rate
of capital stock. The analysis for the US yields a diﬀerent picture. Despite two regimes
are identiﬁed (Figure 2d), they diﬀer by just 1.1 percentage points. We identify a high
regime mean up to 1985 (with two temporary negative shocks corresponding to the oil
price crises), followed by a low regime mean which ends by an upwards shift. However,
we interpret this low regime as a temporary response to a persistent shock identiﬁed
with the anti-inﬂationist monetary policy of the Volcker era, lasting from 1979 to 1987,
which shifted real interest rates upwards.
Beyond this quantitative analysis, the general picture that emerges is the following.
In Europe there is a permanent shift, which is expressed as an upwards unemployment
regime shift of 7.2 percentage points, that our analysis relates with the 2.2 percentage
points reduction in the mean growth rate of capital stock. On the contrary, there is no
such a permanent shift in the US unemployment and capital stock growth series. The
appropriateness of a multiple equilibria model for Europe, assigning a relevant role to
capital formation, seems clear.
Finally, let’s turn our attention to the path of the direct tax rates. In Raurich,
Sala and Sorolla (2004) the trajectory of the direct tax rates (as percentage of GDP)
is related to economic growth. In particular, in all European countries with the sole
exception of the UK, it can be shown that during the high regime (in the 1960s and
ﬁrst 1970s) the value of the tax rate was low, whereas it was high during the low regime
(in the 1980s and 1990s).
As stated before, we interpret that a negative relationship between economic growth
and the direct tax rate corresponds to a scenario of endogenous tax rates, whereas the
lack of relation between these two series corresponds to a scenario of exogenous tax
rates. Table 1 presents the estimates of the correlation between the direct tax rate and
the growth rate taking 3-years means, which is signiﬁcant in the European countries
(between 5% and 25% in the Netherlands, Sweden and Finland, but at 5% in the rest
of the countries) with the exception of the UK12, resembling the US case where it is not
weights being amended correspondingly: data for Sweden start in 1965, for the Netherlands in 1968
and for Finland in 1969.
11Again, we present the country-speciﬁc analysis in Raurich, Sala and Sorolla (2004), where the
Kernel density analysis displayed in Figure 5 underlies the permanent regime changes plotted in Figure
4. In eight out of eleven countries two regimes are identiﬁed. Two of the exceptions are Finland and
Netherlands, where only one regime is identiﬁed due to the lack of data in the 1960s (the series start
in 1970 and 1969, respectively), which prevents the Kernel density analysis to consider the few data
points with high values as a separate regime. It is important to note that all the regime changes take
place in the mid 1970s, when the unemployment rates in these countries started to rise sharply (see
Table 1 in Raurich, Sala and Sorolla (2004)).
12We would like to draw attention on the fact that the UK is the sole European country without
a regime mean shift in the capital stock growth rates, at the same time that the pattern of its ﬁscal
policy diﬀers from the rest of the European countries.
7signiﬁcant at all.13
[Insert Table 1]
It seems, thus, that there is a diﬀerent ﬁscal policy pattern in Europe and the US,
which leads us to think that the ﬁscal policy, mainly the pattern of the direct tax rates,
may be a relevant factor underlying these two areas’ diﬀerent economic performance.14
This is taken into account in the theoretical model presented in Section 3.
3. The Economy
In order to provide an explanation of the empirical regularities just described, in this
section we develop a simple one sector endogenous growth model with labor market
frictions.
3.1. Labor market: the ﬁrms and unions’ problem




1−α ,A > 0,α ∈ (0,1), (3.1)
where Y (t) is the gross domestic product (GDP), K (t) is the aggregate stock of capital,
L(t) is the number of employed workers,and d(t)=
¯ K(t)
¯ L(t) is a production externality
accruing from the average capital stock per employee in the economy.15 Thus, TFP is
determined by the technological parameter, A, and the path of the average capital stock,
d(t). Note that the particular way of introducing this externality makes the production
function be homogenous of degree one with respect to the capital stock. Because of
this homogeneity, the returns on capital are constant in equilibrium, which makes the
model exhibit balanced growth in the long run.
Assume that there is a large number of price-taker ﬁrms, implying that they do not
take externalities into account when maximizing proﬁts. Proﬁt maximization implies





and the wage is




13These results consist on a very simple regression of the sort of the ones presented in Fatás and
Mihov (2001), which take the following form: zt = α + β∆yt + νt,where zt is the ﬁscal variable and
yt is GDP. Following Blanchard and Wolfers’ (2000) and Phelps and Zoega’s (2001) methodology, we
take 3-years means to have a closer approximation to the structural relation between direct taxes and
economic growth. Table 1 presents the estimated β for the European countries and the US.
14When focussing on the cyclical behavior of the ﬁscal policy, the literature also reveals diﬀerences
between the ﬁscal policies in the US and in most of the European economies. See, among many others,
Buti, Franco and Ongena (1997), Fatás and Mihov (2001) and Calmfors et al. (2003).
15This externality is justiﬁed by Arrow (1962) as a result of a learning by doing process.











Close the model of the labor market by assuming a simple model of ﬁrm-level wage
s e t t i n g ,w h e r eal a r g en u m b e ro fu n i o n ss e tt h ew a g et om a x i m i z e :
Max
w(t)




where ws (t) is the reference wage, τ (t) is the direct tax rate and γ>0 provides a
measure of the wage gap weight in the unions’ objective function. When setting the
wage, unions take into account the change in the amount of labor (i.e., in the ﬁrm’s
labor demand) but, since there is a large number of unions, the externality is not taken
into account, nor the future eﬀects on the reference wage. Thus, the solution of the




(1 − τ (t))(1 − αγ)
. (3.3)
The reference wage is a controversial variable in the literature. On the one hand,
in wage bargaining models it has been typically identiﬁed as an external income that
workers obtain when becoming unemployed. According to this, the reference wage
coincides with the average labor income (see chapter 2, page 101, of Layard et al.
(1991)). On the other hand, Blanchard and Katz (1999) and Blanchard and Wolfers
(2000) argue that the reference wage also depends on unemployment beneﬁts, past
wages and Social Security beneﬁts, among other variables. When the reference wage
depends on past wages, there is wage inertia, as follows from (3.3). In that case, the
reference wage is a state variable that can be interpreted as a habit stock on the average
labor income because the unions’ objective function depends on current wages relative
to this reference level. As our aim is to emphasize the eﬀect of wage inertia, we follow
the simplifying assumption of de la Croix and Collard (2000) and assume that the
reference wage is an external stock of habits that only depends on past average labor
income.16 In particular, we assume that the reference wage is the following weighted









where ws (0) i st h ei n i t i a lv a l u eo ft h er e f e r e n c ew a g e ,x(t) is the workers’ average labor
income and θ>0 provides a measure of the wage adjustment rate. Note that the higher
θ, the lower is the weight of the past average labor income in determining the reference
wage (and the lower is the wage inertia). Actually, if θ diverges to inﬁnite, the reference
wage coincides with the current average income, thereby excluding wage inertia. In this
way, our formulation of habits includes the approach of Layard et al. (1991), in which
16Given that unions do not consider the eﬀects of current wages on the future reference wage, the
latter is interpreted as an external habit in the unions objective function.
9the reference wage coincides with the current average income, as a limiting case.
The law of motion of the reference wage is obtained by diﬀerentiating (3.4) with
respect to time
˙ w
s (t)=θ(x(t) − w
s (t)), (3.5)
where the average labor income is assumed to be
x(t)=( 1− τ (t))l(t)w(t)+λ(1 − τ (t))(1 − l(t))w(t) − jw(t), (3.6)
with λ ∈ (0,1),j>0,λ(1 − τ (t))w(t) being the unemployment beneﬁts, jw(t) aw a g e
tax,17 and l(t)=
L(t)
N(t) the employment rate, deﬁned as the ratio of employed workers
on the aggregate labor supply. From now on, it is assumed that λ(1 − τ (t)) − j>0,
since otherwise the unemployed workers’ labor income would be negative.
Because the current average labor income is proportional to the wage and, hence, to
per capita GDP, the wage set by the unions rises with economic growth. In Section 4
we show that in the absence of wage inertia, the rise in labor demand due to economic
growth fully translates into wage increases preventing employment growth. In contrast,
when there is wage inertia, labor demand increases do not fully translate into higher
wages and hence economic growth causes employment to rise. Since sustained growth
implies permanent labor demand growth, wage inertia limits wage adjustments even
in the long run, implying a long run positive relation between economic growth and
employment.
3.2. Consumers
Assume that there is a unique inﬁnitely lived dynasty in the economy. Let N (t) be
the number of members of this dynasty that inelastically supply one unit of labor so
that the aggregate labor supply is equal to N (t) and coincides with the size of the










dt, ρ − n>0,σ> 0,
subject to the per capita budget constraint18
c(t)+˙ k(t) = ((1 − τ (t))r(t) − n − δ)k(t)+x(t),
where c(t) and k(t) are, respectively, the consumption and capital stock of each member
in the economy, ρ>0 is the subjective discount rate, σ>0 is the inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, n>0 is the constant population growth rate,
and δ>0 is the constant depreciation rate.
The solution to the dynasty maximization problem is characterized by the growth
17In our model, these taxes amount to any wage tax diﬀerent from the income tax. As an example,
consider Social Security contributions. Footnote 25 gives further details.
18Observe that the revenues of the dynasty accrue from capital income and average labor income,
which is introduced due to the assumption of a unique dynasty. These revenues should be modiﬁed
if considering several dynasties with diﬀerent labor incomes, but this heterogeneity would not modify
the results of the paper.




(1 − τ (t))r(t) − δ − ρ
σ
, (3.7)




−σ =0 . (3.8)
3.3. Government
Assume that the government follows a balanced budget rule, so that its budget con-
straint is given by the following equation:
τ (t)Y (t)+jN (t)w(t)=G(t)+( N (t) − L(t))λ(1 − τ (t))w(t).
Government revenues accruing from taxes are used to ﬁnance non-productive govern-
ment spending, G(t), and unemployment beneﬁts. We distinguish two tax rates: i) a
direct tax on income, τ (t), that deters growth and employment, as follows from (3.3)
and (3.7); and ii) a non-distortionary tax, j, not aﬀecting agents’ decisions on employ-
ment. The aim of introducing this non-distortionary tax is twofold. First, by using this
tax, the government budget constraint can be calibrated using actual data on direct
tax rates and government spending. Second, it allows the government to ﬁnance part
of its spending without deterring employment.
Using (3.1) and (3.2), the government budget constraint can be rewritten as follows:
τ (t) − g(t)=( 1− α)
µ






Y (t) is the fraction of GDP devoted to government spending.
We consider two diﬀerent ﬁscal policies. First, assume that τ (t)=τ is constant
and exogenous. In this case, the government sets the path of government spending to
b a l a n c ei t sb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n t . T h i sp a t hi st h ef o l l o w i n gf u n c t i o no ft h ee m p l o y m e n t
rate:









(1 − α)(λ(1 − τ) − j)
l2 > 0,
as we assume that λ(1 − τ) >j .Thus, government spending exhibits a procyclical
path. However, total public disbursements, deﬁned as the sum of government spending
and unemployment beneﬁts, follow a countercyclical path due to the countercyclical
behavior of unemployment beneﬁts.
As a second ﬁscal policy, assume that g(t)=g is constant and exogenous, and the
government sets the value of the direct tax rate to balance its budget constraint in each
period. In that case, the path of the direct tax rate is endogenous and it is determined
11by the government budget constraint as the following function of the employment rate:
τ (l(t)) =
gl(t) + ((1 − l(t))λ − j)(1− α)




0 (l(t)) = (1 − α)
µ
(g − 1)λ +[ 1− λ(1 − α)]j




as λ(1 − τ) >jimplies that (g − 1)λ+[1− λ(1 − α)]j<0. The fact that τ0 (l(t)) < 0
implies that the endogenous tax rate follows a countercyclical path. In this case, total
public disbursements also follow a countercyclical path because of the unemployment
beneﬁts eﬀect.
These ﬁscal policies assume that the government balances its budget constraint in
each period despite, as shown by the data, governments do not always proceed in this
way and run deﬁcits during recessions. Moreover, by increasing public deﬁcits, gov-
ernments can keep direct tax rates constant which, as shown in next section, implies a
unique equilibrium path in our model. Nevertheless, the path of the direct tax rates in
most European economies is not constant and, like public deﬁcits, exhibit a counter-
cyclical behavior (see Table 1). This suggests that the rise in total public disbursements
during recessions are ﬁnanced via both direct taxes and public deﬁcits. When the gov-
ernment focuses mainly on public deﬁcit, the rise in direct taxes will be too small to
cause a strong complementarity between employment and saving decisions that explains
hysteresis. In contrast, when direct taxes are mainly used, their rise during recessions
may be large enough to explain hysteresis even if the government runs public deﬁcits.
Therefore, the relevant question is if the increases in the direct tax rates displayed by
t h ed a t ac a u s eas u ﬃciently strong complementarity to explain hysteresis. Section 5
shows that, in case of hysteresis, the rise in direct taxes implied by the model is similar
to the rise in these taxes occurred in several European economies (see Table 3 as an
example). Thus, according to our model, the rise in direct taxes is central to explain
hysteresis. As our aim is to show the economic consequences of rising direct taxes dur-
ing recessions, in Section 5 we make the simplifying assumption that the government
follows a balanced budget rule.19
3.4. Equilibrium: the employment and savings rate
To characterize the equilibrium path of the employment and savings rates, we use the
resource constraint and the equations characterizing the labor market and the consump-
tion growth rate.
Let N (t) be the aggregate labor supply, and let y(t)and k(t) be the output and




N(t).F r o mn o w





is the employment rate. Then, along a symmetric equilibrium, the per capita production
function is
y(t)=Ak (t),
19In fact, the result of the paper would hold even if the government does not run a balanced budget
rule, provided the direct tax rates are endogenous and rise strongly during recessions.




(1 − α)Ak (t)
l(t)
. (3.12)
From (3.12), we obtain the employment rate20
l
d (w(t),k(t)) =
(1 − α)Ak (t)
w(t)
. (3.13)
Note that capital stock growth shifts the labor demand, which enhances the employment
rate provided there is wage inertia. Note also that there is an initial condition on ws (0),
as this variable is determined by past average labor income. Moreover, ws (0) determines
the initial wage that is set by the unions, w(0). Finally, given the initial levels of wage
and capital stock, the initial employment rate is obtained from the equilibrium labor
demand l(0) = ld (w(0),k(0)). Thus, with wage inertia, the employment rate is a state
variable whose transition is driven by the degree of wage inertia.






















1 − τ (t)
= ξ (l(t),τ(t)), (3.14)



















1 − τ (t)
− ξ (l(t),τ(t)). (3.15)
T h et i m e - p a t ho ft h ee m p l o y m e n tr a t ed e p e n d so nt h ed i ﬀerence between two growth
rates: the capital stock one and the one of wages before taxes. As (3.13) shows, capital
stock growth drives labor demand growth, whereas wage growth provides a measure of
the corresponding rise in the labor cost. Thus, (3.15) implies that the employment rate
grows when the rise in labor demand is larger than the rise in the unit cost of labor.
To characterize the equilibrium path of employment, we must obtain the growth of
20Note that, because of the assumptions on the production function, per capita GDP does not
depend on the number of employees, so that there are no scale eﬀects. However, as shown in (3.13),
the employment rate depends on capital stock.
13the stock of capital. To this end, use the resource constraint
C (t)+G(t)+S (t)=Y (t),
where S (t) are the savings of the economy that correspond to gross investment. Let
s(t)=
S(t)











=( 1− s(t) − g(t))A. (3.16)
Because in this closed economy savings coincide with gross investment, the resource
constraint can be rewritten as
C (t)+ ˙ K (t)+δK(t)=( 1− g(t))Y (t),
which can again be rewritten in per capita terms as follows
c(t)+˙ k(t)+( n + δ)k(t)=( 1− g(t))Ak (t).
The growth of the per capita stock of capital is then
˙ k(t)
k(t)
=( 1− g(t))A −
c(t)
k(t)
− (n + δ),
which, by using (3.16), becomes
˙ k(t)
k(t)
= As(t) − n − δ. (3.17)
Combine (3.15) and (3.17) to obtain the diﬀerential equation that drives the equilibrium
path of the employment rate
˙ l(t)=e l(s(t),l(t),τ(t), ˙ τ (t)) (3.18)
= l(t)
µ
s(t)A − n − δ − ξ (l(t),τ(t)) −
˙ τ (t)
1 − τ (t)
¶
.
Finally, to obtain the equation that drives the path of the savings rate and summarizes
the consumers’ behavior, diﬀerentiate (3.16) with respect to time and get






− ˙ g(t), (3.19)
where µ(t)=
˙ c(t)
c(t) is the growth of per capita consumption along a symmetric equilibrium
14path, which is obtained from combining (3.11) and (3.7)
µ(τ (t)) =
(1 − τ (t))αA − δ − ρ
σ
. (3.20)
Combine (3.19) with (3.17) and (3.20), to obtain a diﬀerential equation that drives the
equilibrium path of the savings rate
˙ s(t)=e s(s(t),τ(t),g(t), ˙ g(t)) (3.21)
=( 1 − s(t) − g(t))[As(t) − n − δ − µ(τ (t))] − ˙ g(t).
Observe that the equations characterizing the equilibrium depend on the nature of the
ﬁscal policy (i.e., the tax rate being endogenous or exogenous). This distinction is
important because we associate economies exhibiting acyclical tax rates (like the US
one) with the scenario of exogenous taxes, and economies exhibiting countercyclical
taxes (like most of the European ones) with the scenario of endogenous taxes. Next we
describe the equilibrium path of an economy with exogenous tax rates (Section 4) and
endogenous tax rates (Section 5).
4. The equilibrium when tax rates are exogenous
Assume that the tax rate is exogenous and constant, so that τ (t)=τ and hence
˙ τ (t)=0 . As a consequence, (3.18) simpliﬁes to
˙ l(t)=e l(s(t),l(t)) = l(t)(s(t)A − n − δ − ξ (l(t))), (4.1)
and, by using (3.9), (3.21) can be rewritten as
˙ s(t)=e s(s(t),l(t)) (4.2)
=( 1 − s(t) − g(l(t)))
"
s(t)A − n − δ − µ −
g0 (l(t))e l(s(t),l(t))
1 − s(t) − g(l(t))
#
.
Deﬁnition 4.1. Given {l0;τ}, an equilibrium with exogenous tax rates is deﬁned by
{l(t),s(t),g(t)}
∞
t=0 such that solves (3.9), (4.1), and (4.2), satisﬁes the transversality
condition (3.8) and the following constraints: l(t) ∈ [0,1], s(t) ∈ [0,1] and g(t) ∈
[0,1], for all t ≥ 0.
To characterize the path of the dynamic equilibrium, ﬁrst obtain the Balanced
Growth Path (BGP), which is deﬁned as a path along which l(t) and s(t) remain
constant, and consumption, capital and GDP grow at the constant growth rate µ.B y
using ˙ l(t)=0and ˙ s(t)=0 , it is straightforward to show that the employment rate
along a BGP must satisfy the following equation:
Q(l)=ξ (l) − µ =0 .
Thus, along a BGP, the long run economic growth rate coincides with the growth rate
of wages. In this simple model, this growth rate is equal to the long run growth rates
of capital and, as follows from (3.13), of the labor demand. Thus, the employment
15rate attains a BGP when the growth rates of labor demand and wages coincide. In the
absence of wage inertia, these two growth rates would be always equal and there would
be no transition as in a standard Ak growth model. Therefore, the assumptions made
on wage inertia drive the transition.
It can be shown that Q(l)=0h a sau n i q u er o o t ,w h i c hi st h eu n i q u eB G Po ft h e
economy if it belongs to the close interval [0,1], and if the corresponding savings rate
and fraction of GDP devoted to government spending also belong to this interval. The













λ(1 − τ) − j
(1 − τ)(1− λ)
¶
, (4.3)
where the long run growth rate, obtained from (3.20), is
µ
∗ =
(1 − τ)αA − δ − ρ
σ
,
and the long run savings rate, obtained from ˙ s(t)=0 , is
s
∗ =
µ∗ + n + δ
A
.
We assume that µ∗ > 0.
The acyclical behavior of the direct tax rate in the US can be associated with this
scenario of exogenous and constant tax rates. In Table 2 this version of the model is
used to characterize the US economy in the long-run, which is taken as the benchmark
economy with exogenous taxes. Table 2 also quantiﬁes the eﬀect of some parameter
increases.
[Insert Table 2]
Note that when there is wage inertia (i.e., when θ does not diverge to inﬁnite),
economic growth increases the long run employment rate. Thus, in this model, a per-
manent decrease in TFP (A in the model) reduces the long run growth and employment
rates when there is wage inertia. To obtain the short run eﬀects, let us consider the
transitional dynamics.
Proposition 4.1. The BGP is saddle path stable and, hence, the path of the dynamic
equilibrium is locally unique.
Pr o o f .See Appendix.
Figure 3 displays the phase diagram of this economy,21 which shows that along
the transition there is a negative relation between the employment and the savings
rates: a larger employment rate increases average labor income, thereby causing a pos-
itive wealth eﬀect that deters savings. The following section shows that if government
spending as a fraction of GDP is constant and direct tax rates are endogenous, the equi-
librium displays a positive correlation between the savings rate and the employment
21See the appendix for a discussion on the construction of this phase diagram and the characterization
of the policy function.
16rate. This correlation outlines the complementarity between employment and capital
due to the endogenous tax rates.
[Insert Figure 3]
To see the eﬀects of a shock, consider a permanent downturn in TFP (a decrease in
A in the model). By using the phase lines provided in the appendix, Figure 4 displays
the transition induced by this reduction, which initially causes both a substitution and
aw e a l t he ﬀect. In Figure 4 it is assumed that the negative wealth eﬀect dominates and
hence there is an initial increase in the savings rate. Furthermore, the decrease in TFP
deters growth which, as wage inertia prevents wage adjustment, causes a decline in the
employment rate. This generates a further negative wealth eﬀect that explains the rise
in the savings rate during the transition. Note that the transition in the employment
rate is explained by wage inertia. Actually, in the absence of wage inertia, the reduction
in economic growth would be fully translated into a reduction in the wage and no eﬀect
o nt h ee m p l o y m e n tr a t ew o u l do c c u r .
[Insert Figure 4]
As there is a unique BGP, the eﬀects of a temporary shock are transitory. We
conclude that the equilibrium does not exhibit hysteresis, which means that this model
with exogenous tax rates ﬁts the US experience, but cannot explain the hysteretic
behavior of unemployment in Europe.
5. The equilibrium when tax rates are endogenous
Assume now that public spending as a fraction of GDP is constant, i.e. g(t)=g, and
the government balances its budget constraint by setting endogenously direct taxes.
From (3.10), it follows that τ (t)=τ (l(t)) and thus
˙ τ (t)=τ
0 (l(t)) ˙ l(t),
which can be used to rewrite (3.18) as
˙ l(t)=e l(s(t),l(t)) = l(t)
Ã







˙ s(t)=e s(s(t),l(t)) = (1 − s(t) − g)[s(t)A − n − δ − µ(τ (l(t)))]. (5.2)
Deﬁnition 5.1. Given {l0;g}, an equilibrium with endogenous tax rates is charac-
terized by {l(t),s(t),τ(t)}
∞
t=0 such that solves equations (3.10), (5.1), and (5.2), and
satisﬁes (3.8) and the following constraints: l(t) ∈ [0,1],s(t) ∈ [0,1], and τ (t) ∈ [0,1]
for all t ≥ 0.
The BGP of this economy is obtained when ˙ l(t)=0and ˙ s(t)=0 , which yield the
following equation characterizing the employment rate along a BGP:
Q(l)=ξ (l,τ (l)) − µ(τ (l)) = 0,
17where τ (l) is obtained from (3.10). Again, along a BGP the growth rates of labor
demand and wages are equal. However, when the tax rates are endogenous, Q(l) is
at h i r do r d e rp o l y n o m i a lt h a tm a yh a v et h r e er e a lr o o t sw i t h i nt h er e l e v a n td o m a i n ,
i.e. the close interval [0,1].22 These three roots are three BGPs when the associated
savings and tax rates belong to the close interval [0,1], and the long run growth rate
is non-negative. The existence of these three BGPs is shown by means of numerical
examples (see Table 3).
These multiple BGPs arise because the endogenous tax rates generate a complemen-
tarity between the employment and the savings decisions, making agents’ expectations
to be self-fulﬁlling. To explain this complementarity, assume that agents coordinate
into an expectations of high net interest rate. If agents are willing to substitute in-
tertemporally consumption, the savings rate will be large and thus the growth rates of
capital stock and labor demand will also be large. When there is wage inertia, the latter
implies a high value of the employment rate which, given its impact on economic activ-
ity, causes large government revenues and low expenditures. Obviously, the endogenous
direct tax rate is low and hence the net of taxes interest rate is large in equilibrium.
Thus, endogenous tax rates make agents’ expectations hold in equilibrium, which ex-
plains the existence of an equilibrium path corresponding to a regime of high economic
activity. The same argument applies to explain the equilibrium path of a low regime.
Denoting the BGPs by l1,l 2, and l3,assume, without loss of generality, that l1 <
l2 <l 3. Along each BGP, the tax rate is obtained from (3.10) as a function of the
employment rate, τ (li), for i =1 ,2,3. As τ0 (l) < 0, the long run tax rates satisfy the
following relations: τ (l1) >τ(l2) >τ(l3). From (3.20), it follows that the long run
economic growth rate is
µ(li)=
(1 − τ (li))αA − ρ − δ
σ
, (5.3)
which is negatively related to the tax rate implying that, along the BGP, µ(l1) <





Because the savings rate is positively related with economic growth, the following re-
lations hold: s(l1) <s(l2) <s(l3). Thus, it follows that BGP 1 (i.e. l1,τ(l1),µ(l1),
s(l1)) corresponds to a regime of low economic activity and high tax rates, whereas
BGP 3 (i.e. l3,τ(l3),µ(l3),s(l3)) corresponds to a regime of high economic activity
and low tax rates.
The countercyclical behavior of the direct tax rate in Spain is associated with our
scenario of endogenous tax rates and, as Table 3 shows, the model is able to replicate
fairly well the two regimes of the Spanish economy. Since BGP 2 is unstable, we identify
BGP 1 with the low regime of the Spanish economy and BGP 3 with the high regime.
[Insert Table 3]
Proposition 5.1. BGPs 1 and 3 exhibit saddle path stability, whereas BGP 2 may be
either unstable or locally stable.
22The functional form of Q(l) is shown in the proof of Proposition 5.2, in the appendix.
18Pr o o f .See Appendix.
Further numerical examples beyond the one in Table 3 show that the instability of
BGP 2 is a robust result. Thus, hysteresis, which we identify with the shift between
equilibrium paths converging to diﬀerent BGPs, may only arise when there are three
BGPs. In this case, agents can coordinate into an equilibrium path that converges to
BGP 1 or into another one that converges to BGP 3. Proposition 5.2 provides suﬃcient
conditions that prevent the existence of three BGPs, which help to understand how
savings decisions, the ﬁscal policy and labor market institutions interact to explain
hysteresis.
Proposition 5.2. If θ →∞ ,γ<γ, 1




, then at most two
BGPs exist.
Pr o o f .See Appendix.
The results in Proposition 5.2 imply that the existence of three BGPs requires labor
market rigidities in the form of: i) wage inertia, which ensures the positive eﬀect of
economic growth on employment; and ii) a suﬃciently large wage gap weight in the
unions’ objective function. Second, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution must be
suﬃciently large, since the complementarity requires the savings rate to increase with
the interest rate (note, however, that multiple BGPs arise under plausible values of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, as shown in the example of Table 3).23 Third,
on the ﬁscal policy side there are two conditions: i) the non-distortionary tax must be
suﬃciently large, and ii) government spending must belong to a given interval.
Concerning the ﬁrst condition, the proof of Proposition 5.2 shows that, if the non-
distortionary tax is not suﬃciently large, economic growth in the long run will be
negative in the low regime, which is not sustainable as an equilibrium. To see this note
that, since by equation (3.3) wages are a mark-up over the reference wage, it follows
that wages before taxes increase with the direct tax rate; hence, when agents coordinate
in the low equilibrium (along which the tax rates rise), wages also increase along the
transition and make the employment rate decrease, rising in turn the direct tax rate and
reinforcing the negative eﬀect on employment. When the only tax is the income tax,
this transition diverges towards a zero employment rate and a negative growth rate.
The introduction of a non-distortionary tax making the reference wage to decrease with
t h ed i r e c tt a xr a t ep r e v e n t st h i st oh a p p e n , 24 because then the direct tax rate has two
eﬀects of opposite sign on wages: on the one hand, a positive eﬀect through the rise
in the mark-up; on the other hand, a negative eﬀect via the reduction in the reference
wage. The second eﬀect limits the wage growth and makes the low equilibrium converge
towards a positive value of the employment and growth rates.25
23Ogaki and Reinhart (1998) provide estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between
0.32 and 0.45. The value of this elasticity in Table 3 is 0.28, which is below these estimates.
24In fact, as follows from (3.6) any additional wage tax, such as j, makes the wage net of direct taxes
and the average labor income be non-proportional. When this happens, the direct tax rate reduces
the reference wage growth and, hence, decreases wages.
25The tax j can be identiﬁed as a Social Security tax because it is proportional to the wage. The
assumptions on ﬁscal policy imply that i) this tax is not taken into account by the unions when setting
the wage, which means that this tax does not aﬀect the mark-up and, hence, it is not distortionary;
and ii) both unemployed and employed workers pay this tax. It can be shown that both assumptions
can be removed and yet the reference wage will decrease with the direct tax rate. Thus, our particular
assumptions on j are introduced just for the sake of simplicity.
19The intuition behind the second condition can be clearly seen through the long run
Laﬀer curve. To construct this curve, note that along the BGP, both the exogenous
and the endogenous tax rate economies are characterized by the same two equations:
the government budget constraint and the equality between the growth rates of wages
and economic growth. In (4.3), we have shown that this equality holds when l∗ = l∗ (τ)
so that, by using the government budget constraint (3.9), we obtain
g = g(l
∗ (τ),τ),
which is the long run Laﬀer curve displayed in Figure 5, relating the tax rate with
the fraction of GDP devoted to government spending. Note that in the exogenous tax
rate economy, given a value of the tax rate, we obtain a unique value of government
spending and, thus, a unique BGP. In contrast, in the economy with endogenous tax
rates, diﬀerent tax rates may ﬁnance a given value of government spending. These
diﬀerent tax rates are the diﬀerent BGPs, corresponding to a high tax rate and low
economic activity regime (the wrong side of the Laﬀer curve), and to a low tax rate
and high economic activity regime (the right side of the Laﬀer curve). Figure 5 shows
that there are three BGPs only when government spending belongs to a given interval.
When government spending is too large, it can only be ﬁnanced by means of a large
tax rate; when too low, it can only be ﬁnanced by means of a low tax rate.
[Insert Figure 5]
The transitional dynamics along these equilibrium paths, that converge to BGPs
belonging to the same Laﬀer curve, are driven by agents’ expectations on the tax rate.
If they expect tax rates to be large (small), they expect the net interest rate to be low
(large) and, hence, the initial savings and growth rate will be low (large). This implies
that the equilibrium converges to a low (high) economic activity regime, where tax rates
are large (low) in equilibrium. In this way, agents’ expectations are fulﬁlled and agents
may coordinate into any equilibrium. In contrast, when tax rates are exogenous, the
equilibrium is unique because the government selects the equilibrium path by setting
the value of the tax rate.
[Insert Figure 6]
The transitional dynamics with endogenous taxes are displayed in Figure 6, picturing
the phase diagram when there are three BGPs. Note that, given an initial value of the
employment rate, agents may coordinate, by means of their savings decisions, into an
equilibrium path driving towards the high regime (BGP 3) or into an equilibrium path
driving towards the low regime (BGP 1).
As shown in the appendix, the policy functions driving towards BGPs 1 and 3 have
a positive slope when tax rates are endogenous. Thus, if the economy converges to one
of these BGPs, the equilibrium exhibits a positive relationship between the employment
and the savings rate, which is in stark contrast with the negative relationship obtained
when tax rates are exogenous. The reason is that an increase in the employment rate
implies lower government expenditures and higher revenues. As a consequence, the
endogenous tax rate decreases with the employment rate, thereby increasing the net of
taxes interest rate, which rises the savings rate.
20With three BGPs, a temporary shock, such as a reduction in TFP, may make
agents coordinate into another equilibrium path and thus have permanent eﬀects and
generate hysteresis. Figure 7 displays the phase diagram when we assume that the
equilibrium is initially in BGP 3 and there is a TFP shock (a reduction in A)t h a t
opens two possibilities of coordination giving rise to two diﬀerent equilibrium paths. In
one of them, agents choose an initial small reduction in the savings rate that makes the
economy go back to BGP 3. In the other one, agents choose a large initial reduction in
the savings rate, which places the economy in the policy function converging towards
BGP 1, i.e. the equilibrium converges towards the wrong side of the Laﬀer curve, where
the tax rate is large and the interest rate is low.
[Insert Figure 7]
Observe that the long run eﬀects of a reduction in TFP depend on the initial jump
in the savings rate that, in turn, depends on agents’ expectations. Interestingly, when
these expectations make agents coordinate into another equilibrium path, temporary
shocks have permanent eﬀects and cause hysteresis. To understand why, note that the
reduction in TFP has a direct negative eﬀect in the gross interest rate that makes agents
be willing to reduce savings. However, the overall eﬀect on the savings rate depends on
the net interest rate, in turn depending on agents’ expectations. In particular, if agents
coordinate into an expectation of low tax rates, they will expect a small decrease of
the net interest rate. As a consequence, they will choose a tiny initial reduction in the
savings rate implying a small reduction in economic growth and a small decline in the
long run employment rate. In this case, the equilibrium converges to the BGP with high
activity. Because employment is large, government disbursements as a fraction of GDP
are low, the required equilibrium tax rate is thus small and expectations are fulﬁlled in
equilibrium. However, agents may also coordinate into an expectation of high tax rates,
with agents expecting a large reduction in the net interest rate and thereby choosing a
large decrease in the savings rate that causes a large decline in economic growth and,
hence, in the long run employment rate. Therefore, the equilibrium converges to the
BGP with low economic activity and high tax rates. In this equilibrium, expectations
are fulﬁlled again, but now a temporary reduction in TFP has permanent eﬀects.
To conclude, according to our model, the diﬀerent economic performance of the US
and the European countries after the temporary shocks of the 1970’s can be explained
by a diﬀerent response in terms of ﬁscal policies. In the US, direct tax rates were
kept constant, and employment and growth suﬀered a temporary decline. In Europe,
direct tax rates increased and employment and growth suﬀered a persistent decline.
The model explains this persistent decline as a result of a coordination into another
equilibrium path.
6. Concluding remarks
We have used a growth model with a non-competitive labor market to show that endoge-
nous tax rates generate complementarities between employment and capital yielding the
possibility of multiple equilibria. With multiple equilibria, the equilibrium path is the
result of a coordination among equilibria with high tax rates and low employment and
21savings rates; and equilibria with low tax rates and high economic activity. These equi-
librium paths converge to diﬀerent long run equilibria that belong to opposite sides of
the same Laﬀer curve.
When tax rates are endogenous, agents may coordinate on either side of the Laﬀer
curve. This coordination failure causes economic instability and, furthermore, agents
may coordinate into an equilibrium path that converges to the wrong side of the Laﬀer
curve (the low regime). In contrast, when tax rates are exogenous, the government
selects the equilibrium path setting the value of the tax rate. In this way, the government
prevents economic instability and may place the economy in an equilibrium path that
converges to the right side of the Laﬀer curve. Thus, according to this model, those
ﬁscal policies not using the direct tax rate to balance the government budget constraint
are a superior ﬁscal policy.
The model also nests an interpretation of the diﬀerent performance of the US and
the European economies in the aftermath of temporary shocks such as those occurred
in the 1970’s. In particular, we ﬁnd a correspondence between the acyclical behavior
displayed by the direct tax rates in the US with our scenario of exogenous tax rates,
and their countercyclical behavior in most of the European countries with our scenario
of endogenous tax rates. In response to a temporary reduction in TFP, in the ﬁrst case
the model implies a temporary decline in the employment, savings and growth rates,
which matches well with the US experience. In the second case, the model predicts the
possibility of hysteresis, which also ﬁts the extremely persistent reduction in the path
of employment, growth and saving rates occurred in Europe. The model explains this
permanent reduction as a coordination of agents into an equilibrium with high tax rates
and low employment and savings rates.
References
[1] Akram, Q.F. (1998): “Has the unemployment switched between multiple equilib-
ria?”, Norges Bank Working Paper no 1998/02.
[2] Akram, Q.F. (1999): “Multiple unemployment equilibria: Do transitory shocks
have permanent eﬀects?”, Norges Bank Working Paper no199/06.
[3] Arrow, K.J. (1962): “The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing”, Review
of Economic Studies, 29: 155-173.
[4] Basu, S. and Fernald, J. (1997): “Returns to Scale in U.S. Production: Estimates
and Implications”, Journal of Political Economy, 105, p. 249-83.
[5] Blanchard, O. and Katz, L.F. (1999). “Wage Dynamics: Reconciling Theory and
Evidence”, American Economic Review, 89 (2), p. 69-74.
[6] Blanchard, O.J. and L. Summers (1986a), “Hysteresis and the European Unem-
ployment Problem,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual,V o l .1 ,C a m b r i d g e ,M a s s :
MIT Press, p. 15-71.
[7] Blanchard, O.J. and L. Summers (1986b), “Fiscal Increasing Returns, Hysteresis,
Real Wages and Unemployment,” NBER Working Paper,n o 2034.
22[8] Blanchard, O.J. and L.H. Summers (1988): “Beyond the Natural Rate Hypothe-
sis”, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 78, 2, p. 182-187.
[9] Blanchard, O.J. and J. Wolfers (2000): “The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the
Rise of European Unemployment: The Aggregate Evidence”, Economic Journal,
Vol. 110, 462, March, C1-C33.
[10] Bianchi, M. and G. Zoega (1998): “Unemployment Persistence: Does the size of
the shock matter?”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 13, No. 3, p. 283-304.
[11] Buti, M., D. Franco and H. Ongena (1997): “Budgetary Policies during Recessions:
Retrospective Application of the Stability and Growth Pact to the Post-War Pe-
riod”, Recherches Economiques de Louvain,v .6 3 ,i s s .4 ,p p .3 2 1 - 6 6 .
[12] Calmfors, L., G. Corsetti, J. Fleming, S. Honkapohja, J. Kay, W. Leibfritz, G.
Saint-Paul, H.W. Sinn and X. Vives (2003): Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic
Stabilization in the Euro Area: Possible Reforms of the Stability and Growth Pact
and National Decision-Making Processes, CESifo, Munich.
[13] Coimbra, R., T. Lloyd-Braga and L. Modesto (2000): “Unions, Increasing Returns
and Endogenous Fluctuations”, IZA Discussion Paper,n o 229, December.
[14] Collard, F. and de la Croix, D. (2000): “Gift Exchange and the Business Cycle:
T h eF a i rW a g eS t r i k e sB a c k ” ,Review of Economic Dynamics 3: p. 166-193.
[15] Cross, R. (1988): Unemployment, Hysteresis and the Natural Rate Hypotheses,
Blackwell: Oxford.
[16] Cross, R. (1995): The Natural Rate of Unemployment: reﬂections of 25 years of
hypothesis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[17] Den Haan, W. (2003): “Temporary Shocks and Unavoidable Transitions to a High-
Unemployment Regime, CEPR Discussion Papers,n o 3704.
[18] Diamond, P. (1982): “Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium”,
Journal of Political Economy, 90, p. 881-894.
[19] Fatás, A. and I. Mihov (2001): “Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles: An Empirical
Investigation”, Moneda y Crédito,2 1 2 ,p .1 6 7 - 2 1 0 .
[20] Garofalo, G.A. and S. Yamarik (2002): “Regional Evidence from a New State-By-
State Capital Stock Series”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 84(2), pp.
316-323.
[21] Henry, B., M. Karanassou and D.J. Snower (2000): “Adjustment Dynamics and
the Natural Rate: An Account of UK Unemployment”, Oxford Economic Papers,
52, 178-203.
[22] Hoon, H.T., and Phelps, E. (1992): “Macroecomics shocks in a dynamized model
of the natural rate of unemployment”, American Economic Review, 82(4), 889-900.
[23] Hughes Hallet, A.J. and L. Piscitelli (2002): “Testing for hysteresis against non-
linear alternatives”, Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, 27, p. 303-327.
23[24] Jaeger, A. and M. Parkinson (1994): “Some Evidence on Hysteresis in Unemploy-
ment Rates”, European Economic Review, 38, p. 329-342.
[25] Karanassou, M., H. Sala and D. Snower (2003): “Unemployment in the European
Union: A Dynamic Reappraisal”, Economic Modelling, 20, p. 237-273.
[26] Layard, P.R.J., S.J. Nickell and R. Jackman (1991): Unemployment: Macroeco-
nomic Performance and the Labor Market, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[27] León-Ledesma, M. and P. McAdam (2003): “Unemployment, hysteresis and tran-
sition”, European Central Bank Working Paper Series no 234, May.
[28] Lindbeck, A. and D.J. Snower (2001): “Insiders versus Outsiders”, Journal of
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 15(1), Winter, p. 165-188.
[29] Manning, A. (1990): “Imperfect competition, multiple equilibria and unemploy-
ment policy”, T h eE c o n o m i cJ o u r n a l ,V o l .1 0 0 ,4 0 0 ,p .1 5 1 - 1 6 2 .
[30] Manning, A. (1992): “Multiple equilibria in the British labor market: some em-
pirical evidence”, European Economic Review, Vol. 36, 7, October, p. 1.333-1.365.
[31] Mortensen, D.T. (1989): “The persistence and indeterminancy of unemployment
in search equilibrium”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 91, p.347-370.
[32] Ogaki, M. and Reinhart, C. (1998): “Measuring intertemporal substitution: the
role of durable goods”, Journal of Political Economy 106, p. 1078-1098.
[33] Ortigueira, S. (2003): “Unemployment Beneﬁts and the Persistence of European
Unemployment”, WP series,n o 27 of Computing in Economics and Finance, So-
ciety for Computational Economics.
[34] Phelps, E. (1994): Structural Slumps: The Modern Equilibrium Theory of Unem-
ployment, Interest, and Assets, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
[35] Phelps, E. and G. Zoega (1998): “Natural rate theory and OECD unemploy-
ment”,Economic Journal, 108, p. 782-801.
[36] Piscitelli, L., R. Cross, M. Grinfeld and H. Lamba (2000): “A test for strong
hysteresis”, Computational Economics, 15 (1-2), p. 59-78.
[37] Raurich, X., H. Sala and V. Sorolla (2004): “Unemployment, growth and ﬁscal
policy: new insights on the hysteresis hypothesis”, IZA Discussion Paper Series,
no 1127, IZA, Bonn.
[38] Rocheteau, G. (1999): “Balanced-budget rules and indeterminacy of the equilib-
rium unemployment rate”, Oxford Economic Papers, 5 1 ,p .3 9 9 - 4 0 9 .
[39] Rowthorn, R. (1999): “Unemployment, wage bargaining and capital-labor substi-
tution”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 23, p. 413-425.
[40] Schmitt-Grohé, S. and M. Uribe (1997): “Balanced-Budget Rules, Distortionary
Taxes, and Aggregate Instability”, Journal of Political Economy,1 0 5 ,p .9 7 6 - 1 0 0 0 .
24Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . 1The BGP exhibits saddle path stability when the de-
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A(1 − s − g) < 0.
Phase diagram of the economy with exogenous tax rates Denote by e s1 (l)
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which can be either positive or negative. If ˙ l(t)=0then the phase line is
e s2 =



















Figure 3 displays the phase diagram when ∂e s1
∂l < 0. Note that the slope of the policy






∂l and the slope of the policy function is
also negative. To see this, use the Jacobian Matrix to obtain the equation of the policy










where λ1 < 0 is the stable eigenvalue. It can be shown that |J + lξ
0 (l)I| < 0, where I
is the identity matrix. This inequality implies that λ1 < −lξ
0 (l), and hence the policy
function has a negative slope.
Proof of Proposition 5.1 To discuss the stability of each BGP, obtain the elements































25and ﬁnd its determinant
Det(J)=−
Ã













By using (3.10), obtain
1+
lτ0 (t)




This inequality implies that the sign of the determinant is the opposite of the sign of the
slope of the function Q(l). As Q(0) = −(θ + µ(0)) < 0, it must be that Q0 (l1) > 0,
Q0 (l2) < 0 and Q0 (l3) > 0. It follows that the determinant is negative at the BGPs 1
and 3, and positive at BGP 2. In BGP 2, stability depends on the sign of the trace,







+( 1− s − g)A.
BGP 2 is unstable when Tr(l2,s 2) > 0 and it is locally stable when Tr(l2,s 2) < 0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . 2The proof follows from Q(l)=0which, by using (3.10),





















((1 − g)l + j (1 − α))
2 .
Note ﬁr s tt h a ti fe i t h e r1
σ → 0 or θ →∞ , then a root of Q(l)=0is
l = −
λ(1 − α)
1 − λ(1 − α)
< 0,
which implies that there are at most two BGPs. Next, given that Q(0) < 0, it follows






























if τ (1) / ∈ (τ (1),τ (1)) where τ (1) and τ (1) are the roots of Q(1) = 0. By using (3.9),




, where g = τ (1) + j (1 − α) and g = τ (1) + j (1 − α).




, there are two BGPs at most.
26Finally, note that µ(τ (l)) > 0 when τ (l) < 1 −
ρ+δ
αA = e τ>0, which requires that
l(t) > e l =
λ(1 − α)e τ − (λ − j)(1− α)
g − λ(1 − α) − (1 − λ(1 − α))e τ
> 0,
as follows from (3.10) and by noticing that the denominator of e l is negative. Next, it
can be shown that
∂Q(l)
∂j < 0, which means that ∂l1
∂j > 0. Moreover, l1 → 0 as j → 0,
implying that there exists a value of j, j, such that if j<j then l1 < e l and there are,
at most, two BGPs with positive growth rates.
Phase diagram of the equilibrium with endogenous tax rates The phase
lines are the following. If ˙ s(t)=0 ,
b s1 =
µ(τ (l)) + n + δ
A
.
If ˙ l(t)=0 ,
b s2 =











































b s1 (0) =




b s2 (0) =
ξ (0) + n + δ
A
.
Therefore, Q(0) < 0 implies that ξ (0) <µ(0) so that b s2 (0) < b s1 (0).T h u s ,s1 (l) and
s2 (l) are increasing and b s2 (0) < b s1 (0). Using these properties of the phase lines, we
can construct the phase diagram displayed in Figure 6.
By using the Jacobian matrix, we obtain the equation of the policy function that
c o n v e r g e st oe i t h e rB G P1o r3











where λi,1 is the stable root associated to BGP 1 or 3. Note that the slope of this
equation is positive when τ0 (li) < 0.
27Tables
Table 1: Covariation in the direct tax rate and the business cycle.
.
Based on the regression: τδ
t = α + β∆yt
where τd is the ratio direct taxes
GDP and ∆y is GDP growth
β t-stat. period β t-stat. period
Austria -0.81 -3.08∗ 1964-99 Italy -1.88 -4.60∗ 1961-99
Belgium -1.30 -4.93∗ 1970-99 Netherlands -0.31 -1.30∗∗ 1969-99
Denmark -1.68 -2.14∗ 1961-99 Spain -0.74 -2.34∗ 1964-99
Germany -0.26 -2.17∗ 1961-99 Sweden -0.50 -1.51∗∗ 1961-99
Finland -0.27 -1.23∗∗ 1970-99 UK 0.06 0.18∗∗∗ 1963-99
France -0.74 -2.31∗ 1964-99 US -0.06 -0.56∗∗∗ 1961-99
Note: * stands for signiﬁcant at 5% *** stands for non-signiﬁcant
** stands for signiﬁcant between 5% and 25%
Table 2. The economy with exogenous tax rates26
Benchmark ∆A =1 0 % ∆τ =1 0 % ∆λ = 10%
l 94.4% 98.15% 94.37% 93.77%
µ 3.37% 3.84% 3.22% 3.37%
s 8.26% 7.88% 8.19% 8.26%
g 22.29% 23.03% 23.6% 21.97%
Saddle Path Saddle Path Saddle Path Saddle Path
Table 3. The economy with endogenous tax rates27
Spanish Economy Model
Low regime High regime BGP1 BGP2 BGP3
l 80.84% 96.39% 80.5% 89.24% 96.6%
µ 2.48% 6.52% 5.8% 6.2% 6.3%
s 12.42% 14.51% 13.7% 14.19% 14.52%
τ 10.12% 3.59% 10.12% 6.4% 3.5%
Saddle Path Unstable Saddle Path
26As standard in the literature, we assume ρ =0 .045 and δ =5 % ; A =1 .1416 such that s =8 .26%;
σ =7 .17 such that µ =3 .37%; j =1 5 .4% such that g =2 2 .29% when l =9 4 .4%; θ = .165 such that
l =9 4 .4% when γ =1and λ =0 .5. We also set α =0 .34,n=1 .06% and τ =1 3 .23%.αis the
share of capital income on national income obtained from Garofalo and Yamarik (2002). The following
variables are averages from 1960 to 1999 taken from the OECD Economic Outlook: g is the ratio
of government spending to GDP; τ the ratio of direct taxes to GDP; n population growth; µ GDP
growth; and s the average fraction of family income not devoted to consumption.
27Again, ρ =0 .045 and δ =5 % ; A = .84149 and σ =3 .5201 such that µ3 =6 .5% and s3 =1 4 .5%;
j =2 5 .399% such that τ3 =1 0 .12%; λ =0 .891,γ=1 .617 and θ = .0607 such that l1,l 2,l 3 are within
the range of plausible values. We also set α =0 .4,n=0 .69% and g =1 7 .47% which, like the rest of
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d. Kernel density analysis of the US unemployment rate
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d. Kernel density analysis of the US capital stock growth
Figure 2. Capital stock growth in Europe and the US

























31Figure 7. The dynamic eﬀects of a reduction in TFP in an economy with
endogenous tax rates
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